Churchill which he had received. The First Lord offered his own help and that of the Admiralty in connexion with the naval policy of the Canadian Government: "They can consult the Admiralty in perfect confidence that we will do all in our power to make their naval policy a brilliant success; and will not be hidebound or shrink from new departures provided that whatever moneys they think fit to employ shall be well spent according to the true principles by which sea power is maintained." McBride suggested
that Hazen should drop Mr. Churchill a line: the minister wrote to Borden instead, enclosing McBride's letter, with the extract, and suggesting that: "I think we will soon have to make up our minds as to what course we intend to pursue with regard to consulting the Admiralty, and I will not act upon Mr. McBride's suggestion to drop a line to Mr. Churchill until I have a' talk with you with regard to the subject. TM Some time afterwards on his way home from a visit to England McBride saw Borden, after which the following letter was written by Borden to Mr. Churchill:
Mr. McBride spent some hours in Ottawa on his way to British Columbia, and I had the pleasure of conversing with him on some matters which he had discussed with you while in England. He conveyed to me your message which I greatly appreciate and for which I thank you.
It i's practically arranged that Mr. Hazen and I with one or two other members
of the Government will sail for England about the 26th or 28th of June, arriving in London early in July. There are several questions which we shall find it necessary to discuss with the members of the Imperial Government; and not the least important is the naval question which I hope to take up with you immediately after our arrival. 4 It seems clear that pending the projected visit to Great Britain, the Government made no decision even of a tentative nature regarding naval policy. Borden stated in his Memoirs that: "So far as I remember there was no advance discussion on policy, as that was postponed until after my colleagues had been made acquainted with the results of our visit. "5 Nor is there in the documents which bear on the discussions in England any indication that such a decision had been previously made. The lines of policy more or less definitely laid down prior to the journey to London seem to have included only the scrapping of the Naval Service, at least in the form in which it then existed, and the need for some form of Canadian participation in imperial foreign policy as a prerequisite to co-operation in the naval defence of the Empire.
A few weeks before sailing Borden asked for advice from Sir James Whitney, the Conservative Premier of Ontario: "I would like to have from you as soon as convenient any suggestions which you might be good enough to give me as to our course upon the Naval question. We expect to leave for England about the end of this month. Two questions will arise, first as to the necessity On July 11, Borden and his ministers attended a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence at which Asquith presided. Sir Edward Grey talked briefly on foreign policy. Mr. Churchill spoke at much greater length, stopping occasionally to answer a question. He said that the principal feature of the naval situation was the growth of the German navy--a problem which was complicated, however, by the expansion of other navies. The German navy was always kept concentrated, and with an unprecedentedly high proportion of ships in full commission, the structural details of which suggested that they had been constructed expressly for offensive action in or near the North Sea. As both Austria-Hungary and Italy were building dreadnoughts, the Royal Navy would need, by the year 10115, to have eight ships of that type in the Mediterranean. This would leave a deficiency of three or four dreadnoughts in home waters. "It comes to this, that really we ought to lay down now three more ships over and above the four we are building." The considerable financial inconvenience of laying down these extra ships could be got over; the real difficulty was that the existing year-by-year programme corresponded to that of the Germans. The sudden laying down by Great Britain of three extra dreadnoughts might stimulate naval competition, and would cause the Germans to ask what new fact existed to justify the building of these additional ships: "If we could say that the new fact was that Canada had decided to take part in the defence of the British Empire, that would be an answer which would involve no invidious comparisons, and which would absolve us from going into detailed calculations as to the number of Austrian and German vessels available at any particular moment." Such a decision on Canada's part, Mr. Churchill continued, could not offend any power, and nothing could possibly contribute more effectively to the prestige and security of the British Empire. "The need, I say, is a serious one, and it is an immediate need." He hoped that during the visit of the Canadian ministers there would be long consultations on the details of a permanent naval policy. What he had been talking about was not a permanent policy, which would require careful and unhurried consideration. "But the other need is urgent, and if it is the intention of Canada to render assistance to the naval forces of the British Empire, now is the time when that aid would be most welcome and most timely." When Mr. Churchill had finished, Borden said that he and his colleagues would welc6me an opportunity to talk the matter over with him and his officials, and the First Lord replied that he would make all the necessary arrangements. Asquith suggested that after these consultations should have taken place a second meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence should be held, and Borden said that he would be glad to attend such a meeting. ø 9Borden Papers, O'C. no. 643, Committee of Imperial Defence, Minutes of II8th Meeting, July H, On July 13, the Canadian ministers conferred with Mr. Churchill and other Admiralty officials. Three days later Borden had a private interview with the First Lord: "... our conversation was very frank and intimate. Mr. Churchill was fair and reasonable and was entirely disposed to give us assurance in writing as to the peril which seemed everywhere to be apprehended in Great Britain and as to the necessity for strong co-operation in naval defence by the Dominions. He spoke of coming to Canada with the Prime Minister. "•ø On July 19, the First Lord consulted Borden regarding the speech with which he was to introduce in the House of Commons, three days later, supplementary naval estimates to meet the provisions of the latest German navy law. The First Lord's speech on that occasion was the first public statement on the conferences between the Canadian ministers and British officials.
He assured the House that Borden and his colleagues had been placed in possession of all the facts, "... and we have discussed, with the utmost freedom and confidence, the action which should be taken and the way of surmounting the difficulties which obstruct such action." Mr. Churchill said that a clear distinction had been made between the needs of the immediate future and the elaboration of a permanent long-term naval policy, the latter requiring further consideration. He added that the Canadian representatives had authorized him to say that they shared this view and that any special action which the immediate future might require would not be delayed pending the settlement of a permanent naval arrangement: "They wish that the aid of Canada shall be an addition to the existing British programme, and that any step which Canada may take may directly strengthen the naval forces of the Empire and the margin available for its security. And they tell me that the action of the Dominion will not be unworthy of the dignity and power of Canada." Finally he said that the Canadian Government's de- might be used; but a conscious partner-ship was desired. Borden was present in the gallery during these speeches. n
The following week Borden had discussions with Asquith, Grey, Harcourt, and Walter Long, on various topics including the means of according to the Dominion a voice in determining imperial foreign policy. He left for Paris on July 27, and while there he wrote to the Governor-General a letter which is probably an inclusive summary of the discussions up to that time:
The conferences with the Home Government have on the whole proceeded satisfactorily. A great deal of discussion has been upon the very difficult question of representation. It may be that one of our Ministers without portfolio will become a member of the Imperial Defence Committee and will live in London part of the year in close touch with the Foreign office and with the Colonial Secretary. This of course would only be a temporary expedient until a more carefully prepared system of Empire organization could be discussed after consultation with all the Dominions. In the matter of cooperation in defence by active aid we have sharply distinguished between present grave conditions demanding temporary assistance and permanent policy. We have been promised a statement which will present "an unanswerable case" as to immediate temporary assistance .... We expect to sail on the 23rd or 30th August. It depends to some extent on the question of a visit by Mr. Asquith and Mr. Churchill which has been discussed to some extent. If they should come the negotiations and discussions will be completed in Canada?
Borden returned from Paris in time to attend the second meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence, to which he was accompanied by Hazen and Doherty. The principal subject of discussion was Dominion representation. It was pointed out that the Dominion delegates who had attended the 113th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence during the Imperial Conference of 1911, had unanimously accepted the principles that representatives of the Dominions should be invited to attend meetings of that committee whenever questions affecting them were being considered, and that a defence committee should be set up in each Dominion. Asquith's suggestion now was that either the High Commissioners should attend meetings whenever questions concerning the Dominions were discussed, or that Dominion representatives of ministerial rank should come to London from time to time in order to be present at such meetings.
Borden replied that these suggestions were good enough in themselves, but that they did not go far enough. In acknowledging, on August 28, receipt o[ the secret memorandum, Borden wrote that:' 'No doubt you will deal in subsequent memoranda with the other questions raised such as the importance and value of docks and harbour fortifications from the Admiralty standpoint, the best methods of harbour and coast defence, the arming of merchant steamships, the practicability of aiding the establishment of shipbuilding in Canada by the method suggested. These matters more particularly concern the question of permanent policy which we hope to take up without much delay but which is not so pressing as the other. ":8 Immediately be]:ore leaving for Canada, Borden returned the draft of the secret memorandum with his suggestions noted on it, and with the comment that: "The Memorandum seems to be very thorough and covers the points which were brought up at our interviews, so far as I can recall them at the moment, except as suggested in my letter of yesterday. ":9
On August 20, Borden and his party started on their return journey, and on September 8 they arrived in Ottawa. Thereafter matters went forward without delay. Borden reported on his visit to Britain in a speech given in Montreal on September 21. The impression of the general naval situation which that visit had left on his mind is probably revealed in a letter which he wrote to Sir Charles Tupper on September 25: Copies of the two memoranda which have been so often referred to, were forwarded, along with a letter from Mr. Churchill dated September 17. The First Lord said that he had had his Prime Minister's help in revising the publishable one, and that Borden might make any use he liked of this memorandum. Ten printed copies of the secret one were also being sent, and it was hoped that there would be no need to reprint in Canada. "The •document is one which, as you will realize, might do harm to international relations if it were to leak out or to get mislaid. "25 Borden replied on October 1 that all the copies had arrived, and added: "The secret document which I have read very carefully The secret memorandum was most impressive but the publishable document had not been so well prepared, and it omitted the important statement that capital ships were required. Following perusal of the documents, discussion arose as to the advisability of consulting the people by plebiscite. Monk admitted that the situation was grave and emergent but was very strong in his opinion that this course should be followed and Nantel was his echo. The Ontario Ministers, as well as Hazen, Rogers, Burrell and Roche, were strongly opposed to an appeal to the people. •?This secret memorandum, which has not been published, is a masterpiece of clear and graceful exposition. Most if not all of the copies which were sent to Canada are among the Borden Papers, three of them being in O'C. no. 656. The publishable memorandum is Cd. 6513 in Parl. Paps., I9IZ-I3, LIII.
Although Borden was very anxious to retain him in the Cabinet
•SBorden Memoirs, I, 399-400.
to transfer the ships were made, sufficient notice would be given to permit of their place being taken by new construction39 At the beginning of November also, Borden told Mr. Churchill that the Canadian Government would wish any contributed ships to receive names related to Canada, and suggested that should three battleships be provided they might be called respectively Acadia, Quebec, and Ontario. He also asked that the Admiralty should consider granting special opportunities for serving in such ships to Canadian cadets and seamen. The answers were that no difficulty regarding the names was anticipated; that eight cadetships annually would be placed at Canada's disposal, and opportunities afforded as far as possible to serve in the contributed ships; and that something might also be done about the more difficult question of seamen. aø
The idea of a generous emergency contribution of ships to the Royal Navy had won the approval of the delegates who had gene to London, of the Cabinet, and of the party leaders in general.
Embodied in the Naval Aid Bill, it was now to be submitted to the wider and more final judgment of Parliament.
On December 15, 1912, the Prime Minister introduced the Naval Aid Bill a• in the House of Commons, and one of the longest, most implacable, and most famous debates since Confederation was under way. The bill called for the immediate expenditure of •815 million for building in Great Britain three dreadnoughts of the latest type, which would form part of the Royal Navy. These ships would be maintained by the British Government, they would be at the disposal of the Admiralty for the common defence of the Empire, and they could later be recalled to form part of a Canadian unit of the Royal Navy.
The principal arguments advanced by the Conservatives in fayour of the Naval _Aid Bill were: that the position of the Royal Navy was seriously and immediately threatened; that this being so Great Britain and the Empire were entitled to strong support; that in the best naval opinion a contribution of battleships would be the most effective form of immediate support; that a direct strengthening of the Royal Navy would be the best form of defence for the coasts and waters of Canada; that a separate Dominion navy could not be adequately developed in time to meet the threat; and that the proposed contribution was only a temporary policy. In attacking the bill the chief arguments of the Liberal Opposition were: that no serious or immediate threat to the naval power of Great Britain existed; that the coasts of Canada should fi, rst be protected; that a distinctively Canadian navy would not weaken the imperial tie; that Britain was wealthier than Canada; that a mere payment of money was too much like paying tribute, and would not properly express the aspirations of the Canadian people; that a contribution of warships would be inconsistent with the autonomy of the Dominion; and that before taking such a step a plebiscite ought to be held.
The bill passed its second reading on February 27, 1913, and the following day the House went into committee. Hitherto the discussion, though uncommonly prolonged, had been a normal parliamentary debate; but soon after the committee stage had been reached the Opposition resorted to the most resolute sort of obstruction, straining ingenuity and endurance to the breaking point in the interest of delay. On May 9 closure was put into force; and on May 15, by a majority of 101 to 68, the Naval Aid Bill passed its third reading. TM In view of the long Liberal tenure of office from 1896 to 1911, it was inevitable that in the spring of 1913 the Senate should contain a large Opposition majority. The Naval Aid Bill was introduced in the Upper House on May 20 by Senator J. A. Lougheed, the Government leader. In th.e course of a long speech Lougheed reviewed the whole story of Canadian naval policy since 1909, and presented his arguments in support of the bill. Sir George Ross, the Liberal leader, followed Lougheed. Ross claimed that both parties had the same object and differed only as to the best means of reaching it. He said that the Naval Service Act of 1910, if properly used, would achieve all that the bill before them would do for the defence of the Empire, and much more. He suggested that the Government should withdraw the Naval Aid Bill, and that a supplementary estimate should be submitted calling for 10 or 15 millions to be devoted to the speedy construction of battleships wherever they could be built. These ships could be completed by yearly grants under the Naval Service Act, in the customary way. said, to take any effective step would produce the worst impression abroad and expose us all to much derision. But any action on the part of Canada to increase the power ooe the Imperial Navy, and thus widen the margins of our common safety, would, on the other hand, be recognized everywhere as the proof and sign that those who may at any time be minded to menace any part of the Empire will have to contend with the united strength of the whole. On these grounds, not less than from purely naval reasons, it is desirable that any aid given by Canada at this time should include the provision of a certain number ooe the largest and strongest ships of war which science c_•an build or money In addition to domestic politics, the attitude of the "Dominions" is a factor in the naval question. Using the rallying-cry "the Motherland is in peril," they wish to consolidate those huge territories which at present are united so loosely with England, and to persuade them to contribute towards building ships. Mr. Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, has been here for weeks with various members of his Cabinet. He is accorded the honours of a great personage. He has already promised to provide ships; but he makes stipulations. Membership in the Committee of Imperial Defence, a body which has existed for some years and on which the representatives of the Dominions sit in an advisory capacity, no longer satisfies On June 25, Borden gave Mr. Churchill some reasons why the obstructive tactics of the Opposition had not been countered by dissolving Parliament, and said that the failure to reach any compromise with the Liberals in the Senate had been due to Laurier's insistence, backed by a threat to resign, on complete rejection of the bill. Borden added that if three ships were laid down in place of the unordered Canadian ones it would be desirable that they should be of the same character, class, and fighting value, as those which his Government had proposed to build. He himself could not visit Britain; but W. T. White, the lXd inister of Finance, was planning to go there shortly, and would be authorized to discuss the whole situation informally and confidentially, in order to facilitate future developments along the lines that had been suggested. 45 In the middle of the summer he told Mr. Churchill: "We firmly adhere to our intention of providing three capital ships. I cannot at present definitely state method we shall pursue. My own opinion strongly inclines to insertion of substantial sum in estimates but there are political difficulties which I hope to overcome but which render consultation with colleagues imperative before final conclusion is reached. "4ø Two months later the Canadian Government's intentions had assumed the following form, cast in the mould of the Ross compromise:
After discussion with my colleagues we are unanimous in opinion that proposals of last session should be pressed to conclusion by methods most likely to ensure successful result. Unless more satisfactory and effective method can be devised before our session opens on eighth January we propose to include in general estimates, or to present in a separate estimate, an item of ten or fifteen million dollars for increasing effective forces of empire. We shall explain to Parliament that this item will be appropriated to construction of three battleships or battle cruisers which will be commenced immediately but which cannot be completed until after general election. We shall further point out that if present government is again returned to power at that election the three ships will be placed at the disposal of His Majesty for common defence of Empire until recalled upon notice and that if we go out of office after election the new government can utilize them for the purpose of its policy announced by Laurier last session. I am hopeful but not absolutely confident that Senat• will pass suc'h an estimate. If necessary to secure passage we would agree to reduce nu•mber of ships to two and appropriate one third of proposed total expenditure to harbour and coast defence. Meantime I shall be very glad to have your observations and suggestions. 47
By the end of the year, however, and with the beginning of the session close at hand, the Government had decided not to proceed with the contribution project in the immediate future.
Two communications to the First Lord, dated December 80 and 81 respectively, suggest that for some reason Borden and his colleagues were less confident than formerly that the Senate could be induced to pass any measure which would satisfy them.
will be recalled that negotiations with Senator Ross were being conducted at this time; but according to Borden the Government doubted the senator's ability to make his wishes effective. The two messages also indicate that the Canadian Government was disturbed by the reduced emphasis which the Admiralty was apparently placing on battleships. These considerations, and there may have been others as well, had undermined the Govern- Borden's naval policy as a whole was not clear cut and the philosophy behind it is not easy to interpret. The following summary is offered for the most part, therefore, only as stating probabilities. Borden was a moderate imperialist who believed in closer intra-imperial relations: but only on condition that these should be based on equality of status in theory and in fact. It was this political philosophy, more than anything else, that led him to abandon his attitude of the year 1909, that any Canadian naval effort, aside from a possible emergency contribution, must necessarily take the form of a separate Service. The temporary .contribution itself was in accord with this philosophy, and with that of a large section of his party. He regarded its failure to be enacted merely as a vexatious delay, which in turn helped to postpone the adoption of any more permanent policy. For this latter postponement there were other reasons as well. The large contribution which he intended to propose again as soon as possible would for a time discharge Canada's obligations; while the nature of a permanent policy could not be finally decided until the problem of a jointly controlled imperial foreign policy had been satisfactorily solved or given up as being too difficult.
If peace had been maintained, and assuming that an answer to the problem of a joint foreign policy had been found, Borden would probably have favoured some highly collective form of imperial naval defence, embodying integrated fleet units or perhaps permanent contributions. The problem remaining unsolved, on the other hand, he would have aimed at a more autonomous development, probably along the lines that had been suggested by Sir William White. In the event, peace was not preserved nor was the problem solved; and what Borden actually did when the question faced him later was to carry on the Canadian Service under the Naval Service Act. Borden's pre-war policy •ontained two fatal defects. In the period that lay ahead imperialism was destined to become weaker and Dominion nationalism to increase in strength. Even in terms of imperialist sentiment as it then existed, moreover, he had underestimated the immense difficulty of creating a centralized imperial structure which would really work; and it is suggested that it was because he later came to be During its pre-war tenure of office the Borden Government had not implemented the Naval Service Act. It had not set on foot its own intermediate policy still less a permanent one. Nor had it been able to start its instant project, born of the German naval threat and a fear of war. When this fear became a reality, therefore, there were no Canadian Bristols and destroyers, nor fleet units, nor any contributed Queen Elizabeths, either built or building. There was consequently no prospect that the Dominion could furnish substantial help towards winning the war at sea.
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